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The Scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Liberty Interest: Does the
Constitution Encompass a
Right to Define Oneself Out
of Existence? An Exchange




Robert A. Destro, J.D.*
[Wie must start from scratch and think every problem through from its
very premises to its last implications."'
Introduction: The Need to "Unpack"
the Debate over Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
There are few areas in the law so fraught with euphemism and
doublespeak as discussion of the so-called right to die. This is not a happy
situation for any number of reasons. Perhaps the most important of these is
the need for candor when the topic for discussion is the deregulation of
euthanasia and assisted suicide. This exchange of views provides a welcome
*Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America.
B.A., Miami University, 1972; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1975. Commis-
sioner, U.S. Civil Rights Commission on Civil Rights, 1983-89.
,Joseph O'Meara, Forward, 1 NAT'L. L. FORUM 12 (1956).
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opportunity for a candid discussion. Let me begin by noting the points on
which john powell [sic] and I agree.
We share the view that the advancement and protection of individual
liberty, human dignity, and the common good require robust and open
debate on important issues, careful attention to detail in the drafting of law
and public policy, and active oversight of the interpretation and
enforcement of the law. Both of us accept the proposition that, subject only
to limitations not relevant here,2 a competent adult is legally free to accept
or reject any medical treatment offered, no matter how "beneficial" it may
be to that person in the long run. We also agree that, while the provision of
"useless" or "excessive" treatment is not required by either law or ethics,
reaching agreement on a common definition of the terms useless, excessive,
and treatment raises significant legal and ethical questions that are beyond
the scope of this particular discussion.3
Agreement on ultimate goals, however, is rarely the most important
component of a political or legal dispute. In most cases it is the initial
premise-the manner in which "the problem" is defined at the outset-that
determines the nature of the arguments. When viewed from this
perspective, our disagreement on the role of law at the end of life is narrow
but significant. We start at opposite ends of the legal spectrum.
Mr. powell and others who advocate legal recognition of a right to die
begin their argument with a presumption that there is an unenumerated
civil right to die, and that this right is part of the "liberty" and "privacy"
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 Given
that premise, they argue that individuals not only have the "right" to
control the timing and manner of their own deaths, but also that, if the
right asserted is to be meaningful for those who are either incapable or
unwilling to die by their own hand, they must be free to seek "assistance in
dying" from persons who are willing either to supply the means or take
whatever action is necessary to cause death.
There are both practical and theoretical problems with this
formulation. The practical problem is the easier to explain. Whereas john
powell simply assumes that the right to die is a fundamental right, the
2There is a limited number of instances where individual obligation to the community at
large (e.g., public health) may require the subordination of an individual's right to refuse
medical treatment. Compare Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) with
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Discussion of that point is beyond the scope
of this article. So too is a discussion of the moral culpability of actions and omissions
attributable to the decisions of competent adults.
3See, e.g., Allen J. Bennett, When Is Medical Treatment "Futile"? 9 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 35
(1993).
4U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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United States Supreme Court has yet to accept the proposition that the right
to die as elaborated by Mr. powell is even a constitutionally protected
"liberty interest." Writing for the Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,5 Chief Justice William Rehnquist limited the scope of
the decision to one question: whether a state may require that the wishes of
an incompetent patient respecting decisions to withhold or withdraw
treatment must be proved by "clear and convincing" evidence. Holding that
such a requirement is permissible,6 the Chief Justice wrote:
This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented with
the issue of whether the United States Constitution grants what is in
common parlance referred to as a 'right to die.' We follow the
judicious counsel of our decision in Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,
[citation omitted], where we said that in deciding 'a question of such
magnitude and importance . . .it is the [better] part of wisdom not to
attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the
subject.'7
The language of the opinion is carefully crafted but has been read by
advocates on both sides of the right to die issue as supportive of their
positions. This is understandable. Though the Court did not reject the
notion that an individual may have a right to refuse medical treatment, it
did not embrace the proposition either:
Many authoritative sources presume that the [Cruzan] opinion does
recognize a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a competent
person to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Indeed, the syllabus
prepared for the Court says just that, and the case was hailed by the
New York Times as the first to recognize a right to die. On the other
hand, the Chief Justice's language does not support such a conclusion.
While the majority agrees that '[tihe principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions,'
(emphasis added) the Court never makes the inference itself. In fact,
the opinion states explicitly that 'for purposes of this case, we assume
that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.' 8
Those limitations, read together with the Court's explicit holding that
the right to refuse medical treatment is not grounded in the concept of
privacy but "is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
5497 U.S. 261 (1990).
6Id. at 280.
7Id. at 277-78.
8BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 230-31 (1991).
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Amendment liberty interest,"9 make it clear that whatever interest an
individual has in controlling the nature and timing of medical care must be
balanced against other important social concerns. In the words of the
Court: "[Dietermining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."' 0 This is not an
endorsement of a generalized right to die.
The constitutional argument that lies at the foundation of Mr. powell's
argument has thus been heard-and avoided by a majority of the Court.
Unless a generalized right to die (as opposed to the universally accepted
notion of the right to refuse medical treatment) can be established in the
case law (which is doubtful), it is impossible to sustain the argument that
the fourteenth amendment concepts of liberty necessarily include both the
right to commit suicide and the right to receive "aid in dying." And without
these "rights," the government need not bear the burden of proving the
precise and "compelling" nature of whatever legitimate interests it might
have in punishing or otherwise impeding the actions of those who (like Dr.
Jack Kevorkian) would offer such "assistance" to consenting adults.
But I do not rest my argument on the practical ground that the Court
has not accepted the generalized right to die. The Court's views on such
issues may change over time. Rather, my argument aims at the heart of the
contention that personal autonomy and privacy include a right to either
suicide or "assistance in dying."" I assert that the right to die does not exist
as a matter of moral logic or constitutional theory. In theory and in
practice, such a right would be a contradiction of the "fundamental rights"
principles upon which its proponents claim it is grounded. The specific
reasons may be summarized as follows:
* First, the right to die is a concept that has no fixed moral or legal
meaning.
- Second, while the concept of individual rights necessarily includes
the freedom to refuse medical treatment, it does not, and logically
cannot, include a right to commit suicide.
• Third, arguments favoring the recognition of a right to assisted
suicide:
9497 U.S. at 279 n. 7.
l°Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
"See Leon Kass, Is There a Right to Die? HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 34;
Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No
Constitutional "Right to Live"? 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991).
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(a) assume that individual liberty includes an affirmative right to
engage in any action that is not illegal and thus begin the
argument with the presumption that there is a right to commit
suicide;
(b) fail to address the legal and moral significance of the fact that
suicide is, as a matter of law, a form of homicide; 2
(c) ignore the important role of intent in both law and ethics;
(d) presume that consent can serve as a defense to a charge of
homicide; and, as a result,
(e) lay the foundation for recognizing the existence of a right to be
killed upon a showing of consent or demonstrating that death is
in the best interest of the person who will die.
In sum Mr. powell's arguments in favor of a right to suicide fail
because they assume, largely without regard to the underlying legal,
philosophical, metaphysical, and practical foundations upon which they
rest, that the right to be a homicide victim-by one's own hand or that of
another-is (or should be) one of the liberties protected by the Bill of
Rights.
Lessons from Michigan:
The Continuing Saga of Dr. Kevorkian and the ACLU
Michigan law prohibits assisted suicide. Section seven of the statute
provides:
12Under English common law, a suicide was a felony and defined the perpetrator as one
who "deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits any unlawful malicious
act, the consequence of which is his own death." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
* 189. According to Blackstone, "Felonious homicide is... the killing of a human creature
... without justification or excuse. This may be done either by killing one's self, or
another man." Id. at *188. One who killed himself was punished "by a forfeiture of all his
goods and chattels to the king." Id. at *190. Suicide "to avoid those ills which [persons]
had not the fortitude to endure" was not excused. Id. at *189.
States that have criminalized assisting suicide as a specific offense include CAL. PENAL
CODE § 401 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56 (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 645 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1981);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1964);
MISS. CODEANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-105 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1979); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6
(West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney
1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981-1982); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (Purdon 1973); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1385 (1969); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1974);
WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 9A.36.060 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
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Criminal assistance to suicide; felony, penalties; exceptions for
licensed health care professionals; repealer
(1) A person who has knowledge that another person intends to
commit or attempt to commit suicide and who intentionally does
either of the following is guilty of criminal assistance to suicide, a
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or by a
fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both:
(a) Provides the physical means by which the other person
attempts or commits suicide.
(b) Participates in a physical act by which the other person
attempts or commits suicide.
(2) Subsection (1) shall neither be applicable to nor be deemed to
affect any other laws that may be applicable to withholding or
withdrawing medical treatment by a licensed health care professional.
(3) A licensed health care professional who administers, prescribes, or
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person's pain or
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death, is not guilty of assistance to suicide under
this section unless the medications or procedures are knowingly and
intentionally administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death.
(4) This section is repealed effective 6 months after the date the
commission makes its recommendations to the legislature pursuant to
section 4 [Section 752.10241.13
Two things about the Michigan statute are worth noting at the outset.
The first is its temporary nature. To its credit, the Michigan legislature
recognizes the difficulty of the issues and has referred them to a
Commission on Death and Dying for study before making its final decision
on whether the practice of assisted suicide should ultimately be permitted
in Michigan. The list of issues to be considered is lengthy, and for that
reason it has been relegated to the footnotes, but the list includes all the




MICH. COMp. LAws § 752.1027 (1992).
1
4Michigan Comp. Laws, Section 752.1024 (4) assigns the following task to the
commission set up under the new assisted suicide statute:
Sec. 4. Within 15 months after the effective date of this act, the commission
shall develop and submit to the legislature recommendations as to legislation
concerning the voluntary self-termination of life. In developing these
recommendations, the commission shall consider each of the following:
(a) Current data concerning voluntary self-termination, including each of the
following:
(i) The current self-termination rate in the state, compared with
historical levels.
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(ii) The causes of voluntary self-termination, and in particular each of
the following:
(A) The role of alcohol and other drugs.
(B) The role of age, disease, and disability.
(iii) Past and current Michigan law concerning voluntary self-
termination, including the status of persons who assist a patient's
self-termination, and in particular the effect of any relevant law
enacted during the 86th Legislature.
(iv) The laws of other states concerning voluntary self-termination, and
in particular the effect of those laws on the rate of self-termination.
(b) The proper aims of legislation affecting voluntary self-termination,
including each of the following:
(i) The existence of a societal consensus in the state on the morality of
the voluntary self-termination of life, including the morality of other
persons assisting a patient's self-termination.
(ii) The significance of each of the following:
(A) The attitudes of a patient's family regarding his or her voluntary
self-termination.
(B) The cause of a patient's act of self-termination, including
apprehension or existence of physical pain, disease, or
disability.
(iii) Whether to differentiate among the following causes of voluntary
self-termination:
(A) Physical conditions, as distinguished from psychological
conditions.
(B) Physical conditions that will inevitably cause death, as
distinguished from physical conditions with which a patient
may survive indefinitely.
(C) Withdrawing or withholding medical treatment, as
distinguished from administering medication, if both are in
furtherance of a process of voluntary self-termination.
(iv) With respect to how the law should treat a person who assists a
patient's voluntary self-termination, whether to differentiate based on
the following:
(A) The nature of the assistance, including inaction; noncausal
facilitation; information transmission; encouragement;
providing the physical means of self-termination; active
participation without immediate risk to the person assisting;
and active participation that incurs immediate risk to the person
assisting, such as suicide pacts.
(B) The motive of the person assisting, including compassion, fear
for his or her own safety, and fear for the safety of the patient.
(C) The patient's awareness of his or her true condition, including
the possibility of mistake or deception.
(v) The relevance of each of the following:
(A) The legal status of suicide.
(B) The legal status of living wills.
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The ACLU argument for the existence of a constitutional right to
assisted suicide, by contrast, assumes the existence of a societal consensus
that the act of assisting a suicide is a matter of individual, rather than social,
morality. A detailed list that charges an official commission with the task of
drawing very careful distinctions between and among situations in which
seeking assistance in the act of suicide might be contemplated indicates the
existence of a very substantial doubt that lifting the ban on assisting at a
suicide is compelled by "some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" or
(C) The right to execute a durable power of attorney for health care,,
as provided in section 496 of the revised probate code, Act No.
642 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section 700.496 of the
Michigan Compiled Laws.
(D) The common-law right of a competent adult to refuse medical
care or treatment.
(E) Constitutional rights of free speech, free exercise of religion,
and privacy, and constitutional prohibitions on the
establishment of religion.
(c) The most efficient method of preventing voluntary self-terminations, to
the extent prevention is a proper aim of legislation. In particular, the
commission shall consider each of the following:
(i) The costs of various methods of preventing voluntary self-
terminations, including the use of any of the following:
(A) Public health measures, such as crisis therapy and suicide
counseling services.
(B) Tort law.
(C) Criminal law, including the desirability of criminalizing suicide
or attempted suicide.
(D) Civil sanctions, including the denial of inheritance and
requirements of community service and mandatory counseling.
(ii) The likely effect of any of the methods listed in subparagraph (i) on
the self-termination rate, and in particular the probability that a
particular method might cause the self-termination rate to increase.
(iii) The impact of any of the methods listed in subparagraph (i) on the
practice of medicine and the availability of health care in the state.
(iv) Whether current state law is adequate to address the question of
voluntary self-termination in the state.
(d) Appropriate guidelines and safeguards regarding voluntary self-
terminations the law should allow, including the advisability of allowing,
in limited cases, the administering of medication in furtherance of a
process of voluntary self-termination.
(e) Any other factors the commission considers necessary in developing
recommendations for legislation concerning the voluntary self-
termination of life.
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compelled by "those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."'"
The second notable characteristic of the statute is the relatively lenient
nature of the punishment imposed: up to four years in jail, a fine of up to
two thousand dollars, or both. Whatever the Commission on Death and
Dying proposes, it is clear that, for the time being at least, assisted suicide is
in a legal class all its own. The prison term puts it in the same class of
offenses as making false statements on gun license applications and election
certificates and keeping a dangerous animal that causes injury to another. 6
The fine puts assisted suicide on a par with tampering with a smoke
detector in an airplane. 7
Read together, however, both the temporary nature of the statute and
the lenient nature of the penalty to be assessed can be read as support for
the ACLU's second implicit assumption: that, whatever the lack of support
in the language or history of the Constitution for the existence of a right to
seek and receive assistance in dying without fear that the assistant will be
punished after the fact, judicial recognition of such a right is defensible-if
not desirable-on grounds of political morality. Those characteristics also
support the opposite conclusion: that society is ambivalent at best, and
potentially hostile at worst, to the idea of creating such an immunity by
judicial decree.
The profound nature of the issues being studied, the risk to society of
precipitous action, and the need for the legislature to consider all these
issues before reaching a final conclusion seem not to faze Dr. Jack
Kevorkian and his allies at the American Civil Liberties Union in the least.
They view themselves as moral leaders," striving to lead an uncertain
'"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 513 (1965) (Black & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
16See MICH. COMp. LAws § 28.422(11) (1992) (false statement on handgun license
application); § 168.808 (false statements by election inspectors); § 287.323.3(2)
(dangerous animal causing serious injury). Notably, under § 287.323.3(1) the keeper of a
dangerous animal that kills a person is subject to prosecution for involuntary manslaughter
under the Michigan Penal Code.
17See 14 C.F.R § 135.127(d) (1993).
'8 Dr. Kevorkian has been explicit on this point in his public statements. For example, in
a recent book, Kevorkian writes:
My lone voice cannot accomplish much. But in having written this book and
taken action through the practice of medicide [Kevorkian's term for assisted
suicide] as the first step in the right direction, I have done all that I can
possibly do on behalf of a just cause for our species. I have no delusions about
the end result of it all. . . .But who knows-there's always the chance that
some unexpected quirk of human nature will compel a generally misguided
society to add a new twist to the lessons of history by doing the right thing
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community away from its allegiance to what former Justice William
Brennan described in another context as "the anachronistic views of long-
gone generations,"' 9 and they view the courts as agents of social and moral
change. The ACLU has thus thrown down the juridical gauntlet in the
name of unfettered individualism and has asked the Michigan courts to
declare that:
The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Mich[igan]
Const[itution of] 1963, Art. 1 §17, and by the Due Process Clause of
the U[nited] S[tates] Constlitution], Amend[ment] 14, and the generic
right to privacy of the Michigan Const[itution of] 1963, all protect the
right of a competent adult person to make decisions about the
voluntary termination of that person's life. The right of a competent
adult person to make decisions about the voluntary termination of his
or her life is a fundamental right for constitutional purposes, and that
right is entitled to the strongest degree of constitutional protection,
particularly when the competent adult suffers from a terminal illness.20
And that:
The provisions of [Michigan's statute banning assisted suicide], which
absolutely prohibit and make criminal any assistance by a physician,
licensed health care professional, family member, or friend to a
terminally ill person who wishes to hasten the inevitable termination of
his or her life in order to avoid extreme and unbearable pain and
suffering, impose an undue burden on the exercise of a fundamental
right[, and] ... cannot be justified by any legitimate, or compelling
governmental interests .... 1
In the words of one of the attorneys who filed the suit: "Our
Constitutions [Michigan and the United States] protect the right of
(for a change) at the right time and instituting obitiatry [Kevorkian's term for
the medical practice of assisted suicide] without qualms and without delay.
JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE: THE GOODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 244 (1991).
19William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L.J. 428, 444 (1986).
2 Complaint at c1 29, Hobbins v. Attorney Gen. of Mich. (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County
filed Mar. 1, 1993) (No. 93-306178-CZ).
21The ACLU also asked the Wayne County Circuit Court to void the statute on the
ground that it is a multi-object bill that violates a provision prohibiting such bills found in
the Michigan constitution. This is, in fact, the ground on which the court voided the
statute. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen. of Mich., No. 93-306178-CZ, slip op. at 10 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Wayne County May 20, 1993), affd, No. 164963 (Mich. App. May 10, 1994). Except to
note that the "single subject" of the bill is the question of how Michigan should deal with
assisted suicide in the long and short terms, discussion of this relatively abstruse topic of
state constitutional law is beyond the scope of this article.
The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest
competent adults to make decisions about the voluntary termination of
their lives."22
Unpacking the Concept: The Role of Platitudes, Generalities, and
"Indeterminate Language" in Our Understanding of the Right to Die
But what is this asserted "right of competent adults to make decisions
about the voluntary termination of their lives"? Because there is so much at
stake whether the right is recognized by law or not, the only valid place to
start is at the beginning; that is, with the language of the assertion itself. If a
right is to be recognized as a matter of constitutional principle, it should
have a name that is descriptive of the legal immunity sought.
Unfortunately, stating the question clearly in the right to die context
requires a bit of deconstruction.
23
So I will begin this part of the discussion with the question presented
for this exchange-"Does the Constitution Encompass a Right to Define
Oneself Out of Existence?"-and compare it with the assertions made in
the complaint filed by the Michigan ACLU. Just how does a right to define
oneself out of existence compare with a constitutional right of competent
adults to make decisions about the voluntary termination of their lives? Is it
a claim of right only to make decisions about the voluntary termination of
their lives, or the more substantial claim that competent adults are entitled
to have their lives terminated by someone else whenever the person who is
to die has made a good-faith, informed decision that life is no longer worth
living?
The following table breaks both formulations of the asserted right into
its respective component parts.
22ACLU of Michigan, Press Release, Mar. 1, 1993 (quoting Elizabeth Gleicher, lead
counsel).
23 "Although there are many sophisticated variations of hermeneutic and deconstructive
procedures, they share the idea that the meaning of a text (utterance) is at least partly
indeterminate and that therefore meaning varies from one reader to another." Thomas
Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying
Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1992). 1 use
the term deconstruction here notwithstanding the risk that I may be counted by Professor
Arthur Austin as one of those law professors who "profess[es] to understand
deconistructionism], [and one of] a growing number of law professors [who] mistakenly
think that they practice it." See Arthur Austin, A Primer on Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of
Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. REV. 201 (1992). 1 make no such claims, but since the present task
is to discern what the terms of the debate over euthanasia mean, the concept of
deconstructionism seems a useful one to illustrate the difficulty of assigning meaning to
terms that are deliberately expressed in the indeterminate language of fundamental rights.
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Right as Stated in Right as Described in
ACLU of Michigan Complaint Conference Brochure
Personal Interest "To make decisions about the voluntary "To define one's self out of
Asserted termination of that person's life" existence"
Textual Basis in No explicit basis stated No explicit basis stated
the Constitution
Interpretive "Substantive due process" under state "Substantive due process": a
Basis and federal constitutions: a "liberty" "liberty" interest under the fifth and
interest fourteenth amendments
"Right to privacy" under Michigan
constitution
Characterization A "fundamental" federal and state Fourteenth amendment "liberty"
of the Interest constitutional (due process) "right" and interest
part of the "generic" right to privacy
recognized by the Michigan constitution
By Whom A competent adult person All persons
Possessed?
By Whom The individual decisionmaker, in Not stated
Exercised? conjunction with "a physician, licensed
health care professional, family
member, or friend"
Permissible "Compelling governmental interests" Not stated. If a "fundamental" right,
Limits only a "compelling governmental
interest" will suffice.
Turning now to the characterization of the rights described in the
program brochure and in the ACLU's Michigan complaint, it is immediately
apparent that both approach the right to die in much the same manner as
former President Jimmy Carter viewed lust: as an act of the mind or spirit
complete in and of itself. In the parlance of the ACLU, the right is to make
decisions about the voluntary termination of one's life. In the parlance of the
program design, the right is also confined to the mental and spiritual sphere. In
essence it is one of "self-definition" (i.e., "to define one's self out of existence").
These are interesting constructs, not only for what they say, but, more
importantly, for what they leave out. There is little doubt that all of us have
the ability-i.e., the "freedom"-to decide just about anything concerning
our personal future. Like the freedom to believe, into which the United
States Supreme Court has converted the first amendment right to free
exercise of religion,2 4 a right to decide is most certainly absolute. What is
emphatically not absolute is the right to act in accordance with either our
decisions or concept of self-definition."5 Even under the first amendment,
24 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. (8 Otto) 244 (1879).
25 Cf. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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the Court has held since at least 1879 that "the freedom to act, unlike the
freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.
'26
Logic alone should indicate that there is more involved here than
simply a right to "decide" or of "self-definition." This is borne out by even
a cursory review of the state of Michigan law governing death and dying.
Michigan Law on Death and Dying
The courts of Michigan subscribe to the generally accepted view that
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn either on the direct
request of a competent adult or upon the decision of a competent surrogate.
As a result the phrase "to make decisions about the voluntary termination
of [their] lives" in the ACLU complaint, as well as the concept of a right "to
define one's self out of existence" must mean something more extensive
than the right to die as it has been understood by the courts of Michigan to
date. 27 If this were not the case, there would be no need to file a lawsuit
challenging the newly enacted Michigan assisted suicide statute.
Prior to the enactment of the new assisted suicide statute, neither
suicide, attempted suicide,28 nor "incitement to suicide" were crimes. 29 The
new law is specific: it is aimed at individuals who either provide the
physical means or participate in the actual act of suicide or attempted
suicide. Notably, "[a] licensed health care professional who administers,
prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person's
pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death, is not guilty of assistance to suicide under this
section... 30 As a result, there can be no claim that the lawsuit is intended
to create a legal immunity against prosecution for a failed suicide attempt
by a person acting alone. There can be no claim that it is needed to
26
1Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined in part by Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall, JJ.) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 304; Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-67 (1879)).
27See In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917 (Mich. App. 1993); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633
(Mich. App. 1992).
28See 44 Op. Mich. Atty. Gen. 342 (1944) (holding that attempted suicide is not
punishable under Michigan law since Michigan law does not punish suicide, relying on
1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 328, § 505, which required punishments to be included in the
definitions of crimes and required the same punishments applied to completed crimes to be
applied to attempts). The decriminalization of suicide does not mean that anyone has a
right to engage in the behavior.
29See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. App.), appeal denied, 342 N.W.2d 519
(Mich. 1983) (holding that incitement to suicide is not, under present state criminal
statutes, a crime, and defendant, who provided intoxicated and depressed individual with
gun and bullets and then left premises, with individual thereafter killing himself, could not
be tried for open murder, and information would be quashed and defendant discharged).
30MICH. CoMP. LAws § 752.1027(f) (1992) (emphasis added).
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immunize the good-faith request for, and administration of, painkilling
drugs or other medications that might ease the patient's anxiety or mental
state, or that judicial intervention is needed to vindicate the first
amendment rights of an individual who, like Dr. Kevorkian, wishes to
"counsel" concerning the benefits of what some have called "rational
suicide." All of these things are already legal in Michigan.
The allegations in the ACLU complaint demonstrate that this case
is neither about the right to die as heretofore understood both in
Michigan and elsewhere (i.e., the right to refuse treatment), nor is it
about controlling the decisions or individual actions of patients,
regardless of their physical or mental condition.3' The asserted right "to
make decisions about the voluntary termination of that person's life"
with the assistance of conjunction with "a physician, licensed health
care professional, family member, or friend" is really not about
decisionmaking at all. Its central purpose is to serve as a patient-
centered underpinning of a constitutionally based immunity from
prosecution for those who intentionally administer the drugs or lethal
force necessary to "terminate" a consenting patient's life.
32
If the right asserted in the ACLU complaint means anything at all, it
must mean that constitutional law, both state and federal, forbids the
enactment or enforcement of any law that prohibits physicians, licensed
medical professionals, friends, and family members from "knowingly and
intentionally . . . administer[ing], prescrib[ing], or dispens[ing] medica-
tions or procedures ...to cause death.'33 So why don't we just skip the
indeterminate language and legal doublespeak?
Stripped to its essentials, the alleged right to assistance in the
termination of one's life-and the "right to define one's self out of
existence"-means a right to be killed ("terminated") by one's own hand or
that of another. Since both formulations are legalese for a claim that access
to euthanasia at the hands of physicians, licensed medical professionals,
31Michigan law looks to the intent of the patient in determining whether or not decisions
that will result in death are to be classified as "voluntary self-termination of life" (i.e.,
suicide). Section 752.1022 of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides the following
definitions:
(f) 'The voluntary self-termination of life,' 'voluntary self-termination,' and
'self-termination' mean conduct by which a person expresses the specific
intent to end, and attempts to cause the end of, his or her life, but do not
include the administration of medication or medical treatment intended by a
person to relieve his or her pain or discomfort, unless that administration is
also independently and specifically intended by the person to cause the end of
his or her life.
32See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 752.1027 (1992).
3 3
MICH. COMP. LAws §752.1027(3) (1992).
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family members, and friends is a constitutional right, why not just say so?
The answer, I submit, is to be found in John Leo's recent commentary on
the words of Derek Humphry, former president of the pro-euthanasia
Hemlock Society:
If you doubt that word games are becoming crucial to our social and
political struggles, listen to Derek Humphry. A leading figure in the
euthanasia movement, Humphry says his side lost at the polls in
Washington State last fall largely because it lost the battle over
language. The pro-euthanasia campaigners talked broadly about 'aid in
dying.' But the media and public, Humphry says, 'used the real words
with relish'-suicide and euthanasia-and Initiative 119 went down. In
passing, Humphry pointed out the vagueness of 'aid-in-dying.' It can
mean, he says, 'anything from a physician's lethal injection all the way
to holding hands with a dying patient and saying, "I love you."' Anyone
who stretches a phrase to cover both killing and moral support is a
serious player in the language games.
3 4
The Privatization of Death and the Limits of Individual Autonomy
The urge to speak in terms of rights when the topic is death and dying
is not surprising. The technology of modern medicine has long since
surpassed both law and social attitudes concerning death and the treatment
of the dying. "Unlike our ancestors," writes Professor Barnette M.
Sneideman of the University of Manitoba, "we generally get older before
dying because the diseases that kill us are not contagious but degenerative."
In his view, and in the view of many others, it is a "grim fact of life in the
age of medical miracles . . . that dying is by inches, and that we cannot in
good faith write off the dead until they are dead.
'"3 5
But how then should the law deal with those who are not dying but
want to be dead now or at some predetermined time because of their
present or anticipated future medical condition? The most direct way to
accommodate those who want to die at the time of their choosing would be
to legalize active, voluntary euthanasia, but this is not going to happen,
either by legislative or initiative action, anytime soon. Even in the
Netherlands, where the courts have undertaken to eliminate criminal
penalties for active euthanasia, Parliament has balked at legalizing the
practice altogether. It is therefore highly unlikely that the state legislatures,
Congress, or the American electorate are prepared, either legally or
psychologically, to enact such a policy.
34john Leo, Stop Murdering the Language! U.S. NEWS & WoLD REP., Apr. 12, 1993, at 23.
35Barnette M. Sneideman, Why Not a Limited Defence? A Comment on the Proposals of the
Law Reform Commission of Canada on Mercy-Killing, 15 MANITOBA L.J. 85, 91 (1985).
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The only fora that appear to be receptive to pro-euthanasia arguments
are the courts, particularly in the United States. In the United States 6 and
Canada17 the courts are being asked-incongruously-to declare that the
right to be a homicide statistic (but not to be counted as one)38 is a
fundamental human right, subsumed in the more general concepts of
privacy and autonomy. 9 In the Netherlands, by contrast, the High Court of
the Hague explicitly rejected autonomy and self-determination theories,4°
preferring instead a theory that has come to be known as "conflict of
duties" as the basis for the Dutch judiciary's de facto legalization of medical
euthanasia.
4'
36See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
denying defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment) (striking down state ban on
assisted suicide); People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec.
13, 1993) (striking down state ban on assisted suicide), affd in part and rev'd in part in
Hobbins v. Attorney General and People v. Kevorkian,-N.W. 2d-, 1994 WL 273205, 62
USLW 2728 (Mich. App. May 10, 1994) (affirming that state law banning assisted suicide
and creating a Commission on Death and Dying violated the Michigan constitution's "one
object" rule, but holding that the right to privacy does not encompass a right to assisted
suicide), review granted Nos. SC 99591, SC 99674, SC 99752, SC 99758, SC 99759 (Mich.
June 6, 1994). Oral argument in the Kevorkian and Hobbins cases has been scheduled in the
Michigan Supreme Court for October 4, 1994. The order of the Michigan Supreme Court
provides:
The issues to be briefed are limited as follows: (1) In Docket Nos. 99591
(plaintiffs application), 99752, and 99759, whether 1992 PA 270, as amended
by 1993 PA 3, is unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 4, § 24? [the "one
object" rule] (2) In Docket Nos. 99591 (cross-appeal) and 99758, whether
MCI 752.1027, MSA 28.547(127) is unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution? (3) In Docket No. 99674, whether the circuit judge erred in
quashing the information charging the defendant with murder?
37Rodriguez v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 107 D.L.R.4th 342 (Can. 1993).
38This is precisely what has occurred in the Netherlands. See infra text accompanying
note 55.
391n the United States this takes the form of an argument that the right to commit suicide
(auto-homicide) has been a part of the "liberty" and privacy protected by the fourteenth
amendment since 1868! This is a strange argument indeed given the experience of chattel
slavery.
40See Barry A. Bostrom & Walter Lagerwey, Note, The High Court of the Hague: Case No.
79065, October 21, 1986, 3 ISSUES IN LAw & MED. 445 (1988).
41See generally CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 36 (1991). The case of the Netherlands is discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 52-59.
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I submit that privatizing 42 death by judicial decree is not the answer to
the modern dilemma that "dying is by inches." Centuries of bitter
experience have demonstrated that death is too important a subject to be
privatized. This is so not only because death is as much a part of an
individual's life as birth, but also because death marks the demise of a
person-an individual who bears rights and obligations in a community.
Death marks not only the end of life for the individual, it signals the end of
a community defined by family, friendship, and other important human
relationships.
It is for this reason that death has never been perceived as a social
good, but rather as an unavoidable evil. And it is for this reason that the
preservation of the community itself (which includes the right to self-
defense) has been the only legitimate justification for the administration of
lethal force. Few people actually want to die, to lose relatives or friends to
death, or to participate actively in the demise of others.43 What people really
want when faced with evidence that their death is reasonably certain to
occur within a foreseeable time span is to die without pain and with some
semblance of control over the uses, and abuses, of modem medical
technology. The right to die has been dubbed "one of the strangest terms to
gain acceptance in the legal field"- for precisely this reason.
Viewed from this perspective, much of what is understood to be the
content of the right to die reflects little more than the expression of
legitimate human needs in the face of technology (or, more appropriately,
technicians) out of control. In fact, the very debate over the existence of the
right to die bespeaks the social nature of the controversy. Only the
individual dies; society is left to confront not only the consequences of that
death, but also the excruciatingly difficult choices that face individuals and
families when they are called upon to make life and death decisions in the
context of modem medicine. Such problems are not inherently individual
in nature; they are social and must be confronted from that perspective.
Though we are individuals, "we recognize our mutual humanity in our
differences, in our individuality, in our history, [and] in the faithful
discharge of our particular culture of obligations. '" 45
42The term is borrowed from Professor Donald L. Beschle. See Donald L. Beschle,
Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die," 77 Ky. L.J. 319,
354 n. 142 (1989).
43See Tamara Jones, Setting a Date for Death, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at IA.
44Beschle, supra note 42, at 319.
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MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS: AN ESSAY ON PRIVACY, SOLIDARITY, AND THE
POLITICS OF BEING HUMAN 53 (1984).
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The term "'right to die' strikes a dissonant, if not bizarre, chord"46
because anyone who has spent time studying the subject knows that it has
no fixed meaning. It is used to describe everything from withholding or
withdrawing of useless treatments that do little more than torture dying
patients incapable of expressing their own views 4 to active euthanasia of
those who, because their prognosis for the future is grim, wish (or, in the
case of incompetent persons, are thought to wish) to control the time and
manner of their deaths. Without a set of terms that differentiate between
and among the justifications for individual or third-party actions which
result in death, there can be no meaningful discussion of the nature and
limits of the right to individual autonomy in the context of death and
dying.
48
This suits well the approach of the ACLU. Under the direction of john
powell and its local affiliates, it has transformed Professor Laurence Tribe's
theory that individual autonomy is the central criterion of "personhood
'" 49
into a powerful judicial tool of social change. The phrases right to die and
assistance in dying are used as "trumps in a legal game," 0 with little or no
4 6Beschle, supra note 42, at 321.
4 7Richard B. Fratianne, M.D. & Christopher P. Brandt, M.D., "Ethical Issues in
Resuscitating Patients over Age 75," Address Before the American Burn Association
Convention, Mar. 24, 1993, Cincinnati, Ohio (abstract of paper in author's files).
4 Dr. Carlos Gomez's study on euthanasia in the Netherlands contains an interesting
summary of what H. J. J. Leenen, a noted jurist at the University of Amsterdam and an
advocate of voluntary euthanasia, has described as "distorted silhouettes of euthanasia." In
summary form they may be stated as follows:
" Termination of pointless treatment;
" Painkilling;
" Refusal of medical treatment;
" Force majeure [i.e., a triage situation].
Leenen's definition of euthanasia is "intentional life-termination by somebody other than
the person concerned at the request of the latter." Assisted suicide occurs "when the life
terminating act is performed by the suicidant with repeated requested assistance of another
person, for instance, providing the means." GOMEZ, supra note 41, at 24-25 (quoting H. J. J.
Leenen, Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide, and the Law: Developments in the Netherlands, 8
HEALTH POLICY 197,198-199 (1987)). United States District Judge Barbara Rothstein's
opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454,-(W.D. Wash. 1994),
however, rejects such distinctions outright: "From a constitutional perspective, the court
does not believe that a distinction can be drawn between refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment and physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent, terminally
ill adult." Judge Rothstein's reasoning is discussed in greater detail in the "Postscript" to
this article, which appears in the text accompanying notes 98 to 137.
49See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-05 (2d ed. 1988).
5 0The late Professor Robert Cover of Yale University Law School succinctly summarized
the difference between the traditional American "rights" approach and the Judaic legal
tradition, which is based on obligation, as follows:
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acknowledgment that there may be stakes in this particular game far greater
than may be immediately apparent.
There is no question that laws condemning homicide limit the
freedom of those individuals whose personal circumstances lead them to
decide that they or an incompetent relative would, all things considered,
prefer to be dead and that, all things considered, assistance is needed to
bring it about. But individual decision or need cannot, standing alone, be
determinative of social policy. All law limits our ability to effectuate our
decisions. The question is whether limits on the particular freedom sought
are justified.
In my view they are. The privatization of death turns dying at the
hands of oneself or another into an abstraction. Worse, it ignores both the
reality of human dependency (which goes to the motives for suicidal or
homicidal action) and the skepticism concerning human nature and
experience that lies at the foundation of the Bill of Rights itself. The
vacuum that lurks at the heart of the ACLU's conception of life and liberty
makes the guarantees of the Bill of Rights an empty promise.
The framers of the Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment knew well
that, unfettered by a jurisprudence firmly rooted in both personal and
social obligation to specific persons having specific needs, there is nothing,
"and man is certain to behave as a wolf to his own kind."5' Real people
facing death, excruciating pain, or long-term disability and dependency
"cannot be protected by abstract doctrines" such as individual autonomy,
"not merely because these doctrines are words," and the technologies and
interventions of modern medicine are things, 52 but because human nature
itself has proven to be untrustworthy. The Constitution thus does not
provide for direct protection of individual rights, but rather seeks to assure
that the power to protect them is divided among the states, the people, and
the branches of the federal government.53 James Madison emphasized this
point in The Federalist:
Social movements in the United States organize around rights. When there is
some urgently felt need to change the law or keep it in one way or another a
'Rights' movement is started. Civil Rights, the right to life, welfare rights, etc.
The premium that is to be put upon an entitlement is so coded. When we 'take
rights seriously' we understand them to be trumps in the legal game. In Jewish
law, an entitlement without an obligation is a sad almost pathetic thing.
Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, in Symposium, The
Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law, 5J.*LAw & RELIGION 65, 67 (1988).
5 1
IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 53.
521d. at 52.
53See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE UJ. 1131
(1991); Steven L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. U. REV. 105 (1988);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
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But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
5 4
The proponents of the right to die in this country have unwittingly
underscored Madison's point. It may well be that our society's views on
death and dying are outmoded and impose an undue burden on those who
would otherwise choose euthanasia or assisted suicide as the way to meet
their demise (though I doubt it). But the matter is of such obvious
importance to all of us that judges in particular should be wary of both the
unwillingness (or inability) of euthanasia proponents to call things by their
proper names as they argue their case. The catchphrases are soothing words
like choice, privacy, assistance in dying, and individual autonomy, rather than
the harsher words that describe the acts which are to be deregulated by
judicial fiat: euthanasia, killing, and providing the means to kill yourself.
Such language games should not really be necessary if it is true "that how
one should die is so private a matter, so intimately tied to one's right to self-
determination, that the state's role is to be circumspect and undisruptive."
55
This may, in fact, be "the prevailing sentiment in the Netherlands,
'"5 6
but, given the track record of euthanasia proponents at the polls and in
state legislatures, it is far from clear that it is the prevailing sentiment in
this country. Hence the ACLU desires to constitutionalize its theories about
the privatization of death through creative readings of the federal and state
constitutions. If john powell and the ACLU are to be believed, the support
for their conception of the right to die is a sentiment so rooted in the
history and traditions of the United States as to require that the judiciary
recognize it as a fundamental right. It is not. That is what explains both the
care with which legislators and voters have approached this subject and the
circumspection of the United States Supreme Court in the Cruzan case.
Consider briefly the case of the Netherlands.
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989); Mary Ann Glendon
& Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991).
54
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 Qames Madison) (Mentor Books 1961).
5 5Gomez, supra note 41, at 133.
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Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands:
Understanding the Dutch Paradox
The Netherlands is, by any measure, a liberal society. Notwithstanding
articles 293 and 294 of the Netherlands Penal Code, which make
euthanasia and assisted suicide a crime,5 7 a series of Dutch court decisions
since 1973 have effectively negated the possibility that physicians who
practice them will be punished. It is a contradiction, to be sure, that
"euthanasia is still a crime, and on the other hand, under [recently
proposed amendments to the Penal Code], [the Dutch] will have rules
which say how you can carefully commit that crime. '58 Nevertheless, the
rationale for the contradiction is clear: the Dutch do not consider medical
killing to be a private matter, or a morally neutral act.
He who accedes to another's expressed and serious wish to deprive
himself of life deserves considerably less punishment than one who is
guilty of ordinary murder. The assent cannot abrogate the
criminalization [sic] of taking of a life, but [can] give it a wholly
different character. The laws as it were no longer punishes [sic] the
attack against the life of a particular person, but the violation of the
respect which is due human life in general, regardless of the motive of
the perpetrator. Crime against life remains, the attack on the person is
abrogated. 9
5TThe Netherlands Penal Code, Article 293 (1886) provides: "He who robs another of life
at his express and serious wish is punished with a prison sentence of at most twelve years
or a fine of the fifth category."
The Netherlands Penal Code, Article 294 (1886) provides: "He who deliberately incites
another to suicide, assists him therein or provides him with the means is punished, if the
suicide follows, with a prison sentence of at most three years or a fine of the fourth
category."
The fine of the fifth category reaches a maximum of one hundred thousand guilders, and
a fine of the fourth category reaches a maximum of twenty-five thousand guilders. GOMEZ,
supra note 41, at 19 & nn. 1-2. At 1993 exchange rates, this translates into a maximum
sum of approximately $51,660 for a fine of the fifth category, and a maximum sum of
approximately $12,900 for a fine of the fourth category. By contrast, the maximum fine for
assisted suicide under the newly enacted Michigan assisted suicide statute is $2,000. See
supra note 11.
58Holland Euthanasia Policy Battle Contentiously Fought (National Public Radio, "Morning
Edition" broadcast, May 6, 1993) (quoting Jeff Havers, Health Law Professor, University of
Amsterdam) (transcript on file with author).
59
GOMEZ, supra note 41, at 26 (quoting II H. J. SCHMIDT, GESCHIEDENIS VAN HET WETBOEK
VAN STRAFRECHT [HISTORY OF THE PENAL CODE OF 1881] 440, as quoted in MARION H. N.
DRIESSE ET AL., OP LEVEN EN DOOD [OF LIFE AND DEATH] (1986), and reprinted in 3 ISSUES IN
LAw & MED. 385, 387 (1988) (Walter Lagerwey trans.)).
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Thus, actual cases must therefore be reported to state authorities and,
if necessary, defended in court.60 The concern of most Dutch defenders of
the practice appears to be that "[a] well-regulated and clearly defined
practice of euthanasia (irrespective of how often it occurs)" 61 will provide
protection against potential abuse, but even they recognize what might be
termed the human dimension of the policy. William Roose, foreign
secretary of the Netherlands Society for Voluntary Euthanasia,62 put it this
way:
Everybody in Holland is a Calvinist. The Protestants are Calvinists, but
so are the Catholics. Even atheists like me are Calvinists. And the
communists here, they're the worst Calvinists of all. What does this
mean? We like many rules, but we don't like to be told what the rules
mean.63
Mr. Roose's observation about the nature of Dutch society is relevant
to the present discussion in several ways. It points out that the Dutch,
while philosophically committed to the medicalization of euthanasia, are
also culturally committed to rules and procedures that define and, to some
limited extent, confine individual and physician discretion. Their
"compromise"-that euthanasia remain a crime under articles 293 and 294
of the Penal Code, but those who practice it under state-approved
guidelines cannot be punished-is uniquely Dutch: They have rules, but no
one defines what they mean in practice. 64
Contrasting the American Model
The lesson for Americans in the Dutch experience is (or should be) a
profound one. Americans are not cultural Calvinists like the Dutch. They
are, if anything, pragmatic, laissez-faire individualists, who are committed
60See Henk Jochemsen, Will Euthanasia in the Netherlands Be Legalised? BIOETHICS RES.
NOTES, June 1993, at 9, 9-10 (noting that euthanasia will remain illegal but that the law on
the disposal of the dead will be amended to require that a standard coroner's report shall be
filed in cases of euthanasia and that the coroner will determine whether or not to proceed
further with an investigation). According to recent press reports, the Dutch Senate has
demanded that the proposal be strengthened to assure that all cases of involuntary
euthanasia be prosecuted. See The Reuter Library Report, Dutch To Amend Controversial
Euthanasia Law, June 11, 1993, BC cycle (available through NEXIS). [Editor's Note: The
Dutch Parliament has enacted new legislation formalizing reporting requirements for
physicians participating in euthanasia and implementing procedures to be followed by
coroners upon receiving reports indicating euthanasia as the cause of death.]
6 1
GOMEZ, supra note 41, at 57.
62Nederlands Vereniging voor Vrijwillinge Euthanasie (NVVE).
6 3GOMEZ, supra note 41, at 95.
6 4According to Roose, "If we didn't trust our doctors, euthanasia would be intolerable."
Id. at 149 n.15.
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in the abstract to human rights and the dignity of all, but who chafe at the
very idea of legal limits on their autonomy. For Americans rules limiting
individual freedom are a necessary evil that must be justified before they are
accepted. If the law in question is found to be an unconstitutional violation
of one's right to liberty or privacy, the field is deregulated by judicial
decree. H. Tristam Engelhardt's views on the matter are more typically
American than anything found in the Dutch experience to date:
Against any claims regarding the importance of the sanctity of life,
counterclaims can be advanced regarding the sanctity of free choice.
Another way of putting this is that killing cannot be shown to be a
malum in se, at least in terms of general philosophic arguments that do
not already presuppose a particular ideological or religious viewpoint.
What is wrong with murder is taking another person's life without
permission. Consent cures. The competent suicide consents.
65
Though Engelhardt's argument rests on the assumption that
"ideological or religious viewpoint[s I" are irrelevant to either the making of
public policy or the formulation of rights-a questionable proposition in its
own right, but a topic far beyond the scope of this article-his position on
the central issue is very clear indeed. "[WIhen stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the . . . controversy," natural death,
homicide, and assisted suicide "are simply [three] alternative medical
methods of dealing with" diseases or conditions that kill, or make you wish
you were dead.
66
But once moral arguments are gone, what is left? A respect for the
autonomy of others that springs, fully developed, from some abstract
conception of humanity? Michael Ignatieff points out the fallacy of such an
approach in The Needs of Strangers:
Woe betide any man who depends on the abstract humanity of another
for his food and protection. Woe betide any man who has no state, no
family, no neighbourhood, no community that can stand behind to
enforce his claim of need. [King] Lear learns too late that it is power
and violence that rule the heath, not obligation.
67
65GOMEZ, supra note 41, at 133-34 (quoting H. Tristam Engelhardt, Death by Free Choice:
Variations on an Antique Theme, in SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 251, 264-65 (Baruch Brody ed.,
1989) (emphasis added)).
6 6 The language is taken from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663, n.3
(D. Conn. 1975)). In full, the quoted sentence reads: "'[Albortion and childbirth, when
stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply
two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy ... ' Id.
6 7
1IGNATIEFF, supra note 45.
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John powell's argument is thus not simply about the autonomy of the
individual. It is, at bottom, about what kind of society we will have, both
now and in the future. In the legal world of the ACLU, individual
autonomy functions as trump leading to the deregulation of behaviors
thought for centuries to be malum in se.
Given its basis in a morality which posits that denial of individual
choice is the only human act which is malum in se, the ACLU argument
makes perfect sense. The problem is that such a vision of social morality is
not consistent with either the existence of a civil society or the
constitutional concept of "ordered liberty."
Unpacking the Interests
Should Consent Be a Defense to Homicide?
Given that "the freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot
be absolute," what are we to make of the ACLU's assertion that what
would otherwise be homicide should be immunized by private words or
conduct indicating consent? This, of course, is the ultimate question.69
If it is true that the morality and legality of otherwise murderous or
suicidal behavior is determined by victim consent, rather than the intent of
the person who delivers the lethal agent or force, two conclusions must
follow. The first is that autonomous choice is the sine qua non, or first
principle, of both public morality and the concept of ordered liberty. In
theory this would mean that the primacy of autonomous choice over
countervailing public interests is a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '"' 0
In practice it would mean that such choices may not be inhibited without a
showing of great societal need (i.e., a compelling state interest).
The second conclusion is that intentional killing of oneself or another
is not malum in se, but merely malum prohibitum. H. Tristam Engelhardt's
position-"consent cures"-is forthright on this point. The law, however,
is just as clearly to the contrary.7
6
8 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, and joined on this point by Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ.).
69Cf. Sneideman, supra note 35.
7 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 205 (1934).
71See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed.
1986):
Consent of the victim is a defense only when it negates an element of the
offense or precludes infliction of the harm to be prevented by the law defining
the offense .... Generally, it may be said that consent by the victim is not a
defense in criminal prosecution. The explanation most commonly given is that
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Both propositions are difficult to sustain. The phrase ordered liberty
presupposes a balance between autonomy and social order. More important
for present purposes, the constitutional provision from which advocates of
autonomy derive the proposition that consent cures comes packaged,
courtesy of the Civil War amendments, with process and substance
limitations intended to preserve life and liberty. Consent cures only when
the behavior at issue is not deemed by society to be malum in se.72
Engelhardt and the ACLU attempt to avoid this conceptual problem
by rejecting laws and rules based on religious, moral, and philosophical
viewpoints other than their own. They would supplant rules based on
traditional social morality with a new morality in which autonomy is the
highest virtue and consent is the ultimate defense. 73 It is a nice argument
and carries great weight with those who have not thought through its
implications. Ultimately, however, it will not do.
The reason why competent individual choice is not absolute, even
when there is no case to be made for the rights of innocent third parties, is
that the state interest in the preservation of life "consists of at least two
related concerns. First, [an] interest in preserving the life of the particular
patient [, and] [slecond, . . . a closely related interest in preserving the
sanctity of all human life."74 These concerns have an independent
significance that is both moral and practical.
If we begin with the basic proposition that consent (in its fullest
sense) negates any legitimate social concern over the use of lethal force, we
must also concede that society's right to place a positive value on the life of
each person depends upon individual consent. If this is an accurate
statement of the argument from autonomy, we are in a very precarious
position indeed.
And this is so not merely because of a moral belief in the sanctity of all
human life, but because of the interests civil society has in its own
a criminal offense is a wrong affecting the general public, at least indirectly,
and consequently cannot be licensed by the individual directly harmed. Thus,
it is no defense to a charge of murder that the victim, upon learning of the
defendant's homicidal intentions, furnished the defendant with the gun and
ammunition.
Id. at 511, 687 (footnote distinguishing refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment
omitted); see also WARREN ON HOMICIDE 166 at 829 (1914) ("The law does not require that
a homicide shall be committed against the will of the person killed. And if a man kills
another with his consent or by his desire, he is as guilty as if he had killed against his
will").
72See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery).
73
Cf. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
74Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 & n.1 (Mass. 1986)
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
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preservation. John Locke's Second Essay Concerning the True Original Extent
and End of Civil Government 5 points out that "the preservation of the
society and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in
it" is "the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the
Legislative, itself."76 And thus, when the ability to use lethal means becomes
a matter of individual choice, rather than a matter tightly constrained by the
threat of official force, society returns to Locke's "State of Nature, ' 77 and
civil government loses its unique authority. Locke framed the issue by
highlighting the pure autonomy of the "State of Nature":
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original,
we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law
of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any
other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing
more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use
of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another,
without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of
them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above
another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an
undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
7
Viewed from this perspective, the state's monopoly over the use of
lethal force is not something it can validly delegate to a private party, no
matter what qualifications or personal interest in the outcome such a
private party might possess. That monopoly is a part of the social compact,
and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment stand as explicit reminders that it is the obligation of the federal
government to insure that no one-not even a friend or family member-
shall be authorized by law (or judicial decree) to deprive another of life
"without due process of law," and that no law (or decree) that seeks to
differentiate the value of life itself on the basis of subjective value judgment
is consistent with either the thirteenth or the fourteenth amendment.
By negating the traditional bases on which to strike a balance between
individual autonomy claims and social concerns, Engelhardt, powell, and
75
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Mentor Books, Peter Laslett ed., 1960)
(1689).
76
1d. at 1 134.
77See id. at '1 212-220.
781d. at 114.
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the ACLU use autonomy and consent as legal trump. They address the
"sensitive moral arguments surrounding the . . . controversy" over death
and dying by avoiding them.
The moral arguments cannot, and must not, be avoided. Homicide has
been viewed as malum in se because the demise and death of a person is an
unavoidable evil in the best of circumstances. Intentional killing
compounds that evil (the death of a person) by adding to it a violation of
the most basic element of the social compact (to refrain from intentional
killing).
The burden of justification should thus rest with the proponents of
euthanasia. The traditional view-the one enshrined in the Constitution-
is that homicide is an evil that can be tolerated by society only under
carefully controlled circumstances. 9 Legal justifications for killing
therefore focus on the social nature of the excuse (e.g., self-defense, defense
of others, superior orders). Notably, such excuses neither change society's
conception of the act itself nor permit the act to be justified on the basis of
a purely individual interest. We need, in the final analysis, to know just
what social ends are served by relaxing society's monopoly on the use of
lethal force.
To Whom Does the Right to Die Belong?
If there is an asserted right to end one's life, or to seek lethal assistance
in doing so, the law must determine whether these rights belong to all
persons, regardless of status or condition, or only to those who qualify on
the basis of some set of criteria that have yet to be defined. 8° The ACLU's
Michigan complaint frames the issue as one involving only competent
adults, but the legal context into which it has been introduced-developed
in large part by the efforts of the ACLU-renders that position somewhat
misleading. If a right is to be viewed as "fundamental" (i.e., "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"), the general position of autonomy advocates is
that it must also be considered to be an inherent right of all persons,
without regard to age or condition of dependency. 8'
The case law on the character of the asserted right to die has been both
clear and consistent since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re
79The general view is that the law tolerates the justifiable behavior. But see Joshua
Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of
Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 61, 69-75 (1984) (suggesting that a
justified action is right conduct and that the law should be viewed as bestowing a privilege
upon the actor).
8 1See People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec. 13, 1993).
81See, e.g., Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (privacy of
minors in cases of statutory rape).
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Quinlan.8 2 No matter how questionable or ludicrous their reasoning might
be,83 the courts are virtually unanimous in their zeal to extend the right to
refuse treatment to individuals incapable of making any choices at all.
Through the magic of the doctrine of substituted judgment, infants,
incompetent persons, and those mentally retarded also have the right to
refuse treatment, and the patently fictional nature of the exercise assures
the courts that neither the logic nor the trajectory of their decisions will be
scrutinized too closely.8
There is a great irony in all of this. The usual rhetoric of autonomy
and choice tends to focus on the decisionmaker alone, but the case law on
the right to die makes it abundantly clear that the central issue for most of
the families and medical professionals has not been patient autonomy.
Rather, it has been the need for a clear judicial grant of legal immunity for
the assistants who would refuse treatment on the patient's behalf but who
hesitate because their conduct could otherwise subject them to indictment
and possible conviction for homicide.
And so it is today in Michigan-but with a significant difference.
Patients in Michigan already have legal immunity from prosecution should
they attempt to kill themselves and fail, and it goes without saying that they
have eternal immunity from legal process should they succeed. The issue in
Michigan is unique because the claim is not simply that the attending
physician should be able to supply the lethal agent or force, but that any
licensed medical professional, any family member, or any friend should be
able to administer the coup de grace, and that the Constitution immunizes
such conduct.
The Rights of Persons Who Are Older, Dependent, or Disabled
Viewed in light of the interests of the medically dependent, older
persons, and persons with disabilities, the concern that the incompetent
persons have the same right to die by the hand of a medical professional,
family member, or friend raises some very important questions. Chief
among them are questions related to the doctrine of substituted judgment
itself.
82355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
83one of the most patently absurd fictions constructed to justify an implicit holding that
death was in the best interest of the incompetent patient involved in the case is that of a
"reasonable person with a mental age of two years." Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (Mass. 1977).
84See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1990); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the
Preservation of Life, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 960 (1989) (providing an extensive analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of a number of the main analytical approaches).
The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest
Writing in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Louise Harmon described
the substituted judgment doctrine as "a dangerous legal fiction, . . . an essay
about word seduction and wordless victims, about the hidden exercise of
power and the infirmities of the human mind.""5 The reasons are clear from
its history:
Lord Eldon crafted the legal fiction of 'doing that which it is probable
the lunatic himself would have done,' permitting equity courts to make
gifts of the lunatic's surplus income to relatives for whom the lunatic
owned no duty of support. About twenty years ago the legal fiction was
borrowed from the law of lunacy into the law of informed consent.
There it has been used by courts to remove organs from the body of
the incompetent, to sterilize him, to force medication on him, to let
him wither and die, and virtually fall off the vine.
86
The danger in a rights-based approach lies in its myopic focus on the
autonomy of the individual, without regard to the complex web of
relationships that give each of our lives shape and meaning. To assert that a
patient has the right to make decisions concerning the appropriate course
of treatment without regard to either that person's capacity to make
decisions or the impact that his or her decisions have on others is to miss
the ethical questions altogether. Whatever the right of individuals to make
decisions concerning the course of their treatment, such decisions cannot
alter the independent ethical duty of the medical professionals to determine
whether or not respecting such a decision is medically or ethically
appropriate under the circumstances; the independent obligation of others to
consider the ethics of providing the funding or services required to
translate that decision into action; or the independent impact that
immunizing such decisionmaking will have on society as a whole. In fact,
the issues that define the entire debate over the direction of American
health care policy at the close of the twentieth century are the limits-and
the ethics--of patient autonomy.
The Practical and Ethical "Needs of Strangers"
A society defines itself and its morals, not by high-sounding
constitutional rhetoric, but by reference to its actual record. It is the actual
balance struck between societal and individual interests in the context of
life and death that ultimately will determine the measure of our civilization.
Autonomy claims fail because they ignore the significance of questions
such as these:
* the nature of the person as a bearer of rights and obligations;
85Harmon, supra note 84, at 2 (1990).
861d. at 1-2.
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" the value of individual human lives;
" the place of persons with disabilities within our society and the
duties owed to them:
* the duties owed to the sick and dying;
* the nature of homicide and justification;
" the guiding principles of medical ethics;
* the obligations of families to their most dependent members;
* the relationship of autonomy claims to social duties; and-most
importantly-
* social attitudes toward death itself, i.e., what some have called
the artes moriendi (the art of dying).
One need only consider the data on health care costs to appreciate
why the coming debate on health care policy, including rationing, will be a
critical one for both health care and civil rights law. The trend line is
unmistakable.87
If Thomas Jefferson is correct and "man has no natural right in
opposition to his social duty,"8 the most important question is not "What
are our rights?" but "What are our social duties in the context of death,
dying, and health care?" An autonomy model does not even hint at an
answer. The government, however, is more than happy to provide one.
Hillary Rodham Clinton's health care task force (i.e., the government) is
well aware that the autonomy demands of the individual must be tempered
by the ethical duties, perspectives, and health care needs of others, and, at
least in the context of health care finance, it has prepared a plan that will
inevitably define those rights and duties for us.
None of us are autonomous when the issue is health care financing, 89
and yet the urge to control our own destiny is strong. Daniel Callahan has
87Chart provided by Carlos Gomez, M.D.
88 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, Jan. 1, 1802, in 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113
(H. Washington ed., 1864).
89 Commenting on the repeal of the catastrophic health insurance program signed into
law on July 1, 1988, Senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming noted: "The whole U.S. has
been swung around on their tails by the 5.6 percent who don't want to pay for these
benefits .... We [the Congress]'re not confused; we're terrorized .... Yeah, it's a social
experiment; it's called pay for what you get." S. Rich, Health Law Surtax Defeated; Senate
Votes to Lower Catastrophic Benefits, But Rejects Repeal, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1989, at Al.
The program was repealed in its entirety when Congress adjourned on November 22, 1989.
See T. Kenworthy & D. Phillips, Hill to Face Health, Deficit Issues Anew; In Rush to Adjourn,
Bills of Varying Significance Were Passed, WASH. POST (final ed.), Nov. 23, 1989, at A4. See
also R.P. Hey, Lawmakers Brace for Next Round on Health-Care Issue, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 19, 1989, at 7 (U.S. section).
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accurately described American society's propensity to view "medicine ... as
a means of trying to cure or control the problems of life" 90 and assumes that
the rationing of health care services is the only way to assure an equitable
distribution of scarce health care dollars.9 If we wish, we can continue to
imagine that the primary purpose of constitutional law is to effectuate the
self-actualizing decisions of individuals who, like Nancy Cruzan, are
incapable of carrying them out. If we are realistic, we will admit that we are
not autonomous at all; we are dependent on the good faith (and conduct)
of others.
John powell's argument will not come to grips with this fact of life. To
do so would be to admit the fallacy of the central premise of his argument.
The state of Oregon's highly touted proposal for health care rationing has
twice been sent back for reconsideration on the grounds that it
discriminates against persons with disabilities.92 This should come as no
surprise. Only the dead make no demands upon our system of health care
and those who subsidize it. Small wonder that Michael Ignatieff93 expressed
reservations about the outcome when the balance to be struck is between
abstract notions of human rights (e.g., the rights of older persons, persons
with disabilities, and medically dependent persons) and more pragmatic
considerations, such as skyrocketing costs and the potential for harvesting
usable (and potentially salable) organs.
94
Conclusion
Neither the language and the history nor the logic of constitutional
law supports the proposition that the overarching principle of the
Constitution may be summarized by the statement: "Nothing is malum in se
unless it infringes upon the right of individual choice." John powell's
argument, by contrast, rests on it. If the right to die as conceptualized by
Messrs. powell, Englehardt, and Tribe is a fundamental right, the courts,
not the people, will decide:
whether death should be considered a social good, as opposed to an
inevitable tragedy that is to be avoided in the manner of Dylan
Thomas: a "rag[ing] against the dying of the light";
9 0
DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 19 (1987).
9 1See Robert A. Destro, Targeting the Elderly: A Non-discrimination Perspective on Daniel
Callahan's Setting Limits in SET No LIMITS: A REBUTTAL TO DANIEL CALLAHAN'S PROPOSAL TO
LIMIT HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 45 (1991).
92ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 397 (1994).
93See supra notes 45, 51, and 67 and accompanying text.
94See L. R. Cohen, A Futures Market in Cadaveric Organs: Would It Work? 25
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 60, 61 (1993).
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* whether the timing and manner of death should be considered a
component of the person's concept of the self; and
* whether death might just be part not only of one's self-concept, but
also of one's social obligation, that is, the duty to die when it's
time. 9
Needless to say, these are profound issues that touch the heart of what
differentiates a civil society organized under a limited constitution from
what John Locke described as the "State of Nature." Taken to its logical
conclusions, john powell's autonomy theory of the fourteenth amendment
is little more than a romanticized hope that a society of truly autonomous
decisionmakers will not recreate that "natural"-and brutally violent-state
of affairs. In fact, Locke's description of the "State of Nature" 96 bears an
eerie resemblance to the arguments the ACLU utilizes to defend its views
on personal autonomy.
To the extent that judges accept john powell's arguments, they will
become our guides on the relatively short journey back into that natural
state of perfect, brutish freedom. If we are to avoid that fate, judges would
do well to reflect upon Learned Hand's The Spirit of Liberty:
And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and
women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not freedom to
do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its
overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their
freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of
only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow.
97
9 In March of 1984 Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm shocked a group of elderly
listeners with the statement that elderly people with terminal illnesses "have a duty to die
and get out of the way" because the cost of treating them with the new technologies ruins
the nation's economic health and hampers the ability of younger people "to build a
reasonable life." Gov. Lamm Asserts Elderly, If Very Ill, Have "Duty to Die," N. Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1984, at A16. See also Richard D. Lamm, Let's Address Our Taboos, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1986, at Al. See also Dana E. Johnson, Withholding Fluids and Nutrition: Identifying the
Populations at Risk, 2 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 189, 200 (1986) (noting that the nutritional
and hydration needs of those in comas, those in "persistent vegetative states" or affected by
dementia, and those without a confirmed clinical diagnosis of brain death are also at risk
due to questions of "'bureaucratic or financial convenience"') (quoting Alexander M.
Capron, Ironies and Tensions in Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REP. __ , 1984, at
32, 33).
Daniel Callahan has argued explicitly for a paradigm that includes societal limits on an
individual's ability to seek even the most rudimentary medical care. See DANIEL CALLAHAN,
WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990); CALLAHAN, supra note 90; but
see Destro, supra note 91.
96See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
97
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (3d ed. 1960).
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Postscript
Much has transpired since the written versions of this exchange of
views were completed in 1993. Though the debate over physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia literally involves matters of life and death, the
discussion appears to remain polarized between those who view the issue as
one of individual liberty and choice and those who view these as profound
questions of individual, social, and political morality.
Unfortunately, there is no room for compromise between the two
positions. Either the law will create a "consent" exception for physicians
and others who take steps intended to end lives that are thought to lack
enough meaning to be worth protecting, 98 or they will be subject to the
same homicide laws as the rest of us. Though commissions set up to
examine the legal, moral, and philosophical issues may disagree over
whether the law should create such an exception, there is no disagreement
whatever that the central issue is the legitimacy of such exemptions and who
should have them.99
One such committee of "experts," the Select Committee on Medical
Ethics of the British House of Lords, unanimously rejected any changes in
the law of homicide because it views the prohibition on intentional killing
as "the cornerstone of law and social relationships."'100
Unlike the Select Committee, which did reach a unanimous
consensus, the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying was badly split
on the basic philosophical issue. On one side are those who, in the manner
of Ronald Dworkin 1°' and H. Tristam Engelhardt, 10 2 hold that personal
liberty is the baseline against which laws must be measured. For them,
procedures designed to assure informed consent are-or should be-the
98See Hobbins v. Attorney General and People v. Kevorkian, 1994 WL 273205, 62 USLW
2728 (Mich. App. May 10, 1994) (Shelton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The State's interest in the preservation of life relates to meaningful life").
99See Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, Report of the "Pro" Drafting
Committee "Draft Statute Supporting Aid-in-Dying" §§ 1.07, 1.14, 1.19, 1.22 (Draft of Apr.
12, 1994) (immunizing "health care professionals and their employees," but subjecting all
others to felony charges carrying a maximum penalty of four (4) years, a fine not to exceed
two-thousand dollars, or both). The nature of the penalty, which is identical to that under
current Michigan law prohibiting assisted suicide, is discussed in the text at notes 16-17
supra.
l0 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, 237, quoted in
Bryan Appleyard, Op-ed, Killing Is Never a Mercy to Society, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 17, 1994,
Edition: 3 Section: Comment at 21. The result is that British physicians remain subject to
murder charges and mandatory life sentences if convicted. See Heather Mills, Euthanasia
Pleas Rejected by Lords, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 17, 1994, Edition: 3 Section: Home News at 2.
101
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
l°2See text at notes 65-67 supra.
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only legitimate concern of the state. 0 3 On the other are those who argue
that "[1] egalized killing would dramatically alter the medical
decisionmaking process for patients, physicians, and families."' 0 4
There is a common thread here, and at its center lies the basic
philosophical difference between the views of john powell and me. On this
point there is no room at all for compromise. The British Lords tackled the
issue head on and explicitly rejected the autonomy model on which the
right to die is based: "the issue of euthanasia is one in which the interest of
the individual cannot be separated from the interests of society as a
whole."'0 5 This philosophy is echoed by the members of the Michigan
Commission on Death and Dying, which urges that no exemptions be
created. In their view, too much is at stake for society, the individual, the
medical profession, and families to view physician-assisted suicide as
anything less than a way station "for the [involuntary] euthanasia that will
inevitably follow"-just as it has in the Netherlands. 10 6 Doctors are split
along the same philosophical lines."7
It is therefore unsurprising that identical differences of opinion show
up in the reported decisions. Four cases command particular attention. The
Michigan companion cases of People v. Kevorkian and Hobbins v. Attorney
General, striking down the Michigan assisted suicide statute;08 Compassion
in Dying v. Washington,10 9 striking down the Washington state assisted
suicide statute on grounds that it violates the substantive due process right
to privacy elaborated by the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey;"0
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (Attorney General),"' upholding the British Columbia assisted
1
0 3See Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, Report of the "Pro" Drafting
Committee "Draft Statute Supporting Aid-in-Dying," Draft of Apr. 12, 1994.
l°4Michigan Commission on Death and Dying, Report Opposing Legalized Assisted




'TBoth the American and British Medical Associations have made it clear that they reject
physician participation in the intentional killing ("termination") of their patients.
1
0 8No. 93-11482 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec. 13, 1993) (striking down state ban
on assisted suicide), affd in part and rev'd in part in Hobbins v. Attorney General and
People v. Kevorkian, 1994 WL 273205, 62 USLW 2728 (Mich.App. May 10, 1994)
(affirming that state law banning assisted suicide and creating a Commission on Death and
Dying violated the Michigan constitution's "one object" rule, but holding that the right to
privacy does not encompass a right to assisted suicide), review granted Nos. SC 99591, SC
99674, SC 99752, SC 99758, SC 99759 (Mich. June 6, 1994).
109850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
110112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
"1107 D.L.R.4th 342 (Can. 1993).
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suicide statute against a challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 1
12
The striking thing about these decisions is their all or nothing quality.
Just as there is little room for compromise on whether consent "cures" what
would otherwise be active participation in a homicide, so too is there little
room for compromise when a judge is asked to create such an exemption
by judicial decree. Though the change in venue adds nothing of substance
to the underlying legal, philosophical, and moral issues, it does raise a
troubling issue: the political legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in such
unsettled areas of public policy.
This is so for two basic reasons. The first goes to the essence of any
robust theory of judicial review in a democratic society. A decision that the
Constitution requires the creation of a consent exemption to the law of
homicide implies that the issue has already been decided by "the People."
The task of the judge or justice is but to enforce an existing prohibition.
The second reason touches the heart of the constitutional concept of
liberty. The British Lords are undoubtedly correct in their view that the
prohibition of intentional killing is "the cornerstone of law and social
relationships."11 3 In Locke's view, that limitation on individual autonomy is
the bulwark that separates civilization from the "State of Nature." It is for
this reason that "the reality at the heart of the euthanasia debate is to be
found in [a] confrontation between what is public and what is private-not
just in the sense of what belongs in those spheres, but also in what defines
them. 114
It is (or should be) obvious that the task of defining the public and
private spheres of human activity is a political judgment of the highest
" 2The relevant portions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
15 (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 350 (Can. 1993).
113See note 100 supra.
114Appleyard, supra note 100.
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order. In some cases, the balance is struck and lines are drawn by the
Constitution itself," 5 but in most instances the power to strike a balance,
and to draw lines that approximate it, is left to the political process." 6 Only
one of the four decisions mentioned above-that of the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez-seems to grasp this basic point.
Since the Canadian Supreme Court's understanding of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms is not so different from our own Supreme Court's
understanding of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, we need
to look beyond substantive rules that protect liberty or security of the
person. We need also to look beyond the range of potential outcomes. Only
two are possible: consent as a defense to homicide can either be accepted or
rejected in principle. If it is rejected in principle (i.e., categorically), there
can be no exceptions. If it is accepted in principle, the focus shifts to the
conditions under which it will operate.
It is the starting point-the question-that is key. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington viewed the
"underlying constitutional issue [als whether the State of Washington can
resolve the profound spiritual and moral questions surrounding the end of
life in so conclusive a fashion as to deny categorically any option for a
terminally ill, mentally competent person to commit physician-assisted
suicide." '117 Implicit in this question is the presumption that a "categorical"
denial of choice in matters over which there are profound spiritual and
moral differences of opinion is constitutionally suspect. This, in essence, is
Ronald Dworkin's position: when there are profound differences of
opinion, autonomous choice becomes the controlling value.
The majority of the Canadian Supreme Court put the question
differently. "The issue here, then, can be characterized as being whether the
blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is arbitrary or unfair in that it is
unrelated to the state's interest in protecting the vulnerable, and that it
lacks a foundation in the legal tradition and societal beliefs which are said
to be represented by the prohibition."" 8 For the Canadian Justices,
profound differences of opinion are matters to be taken into account, but
"reference must [also] be made to principles which are 'fundamental' in the
"'See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Amend. Ill, IV (1791).
n6Accord, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1: "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."
" 7 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. at 1460.
" 8Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R.4th at 396 (opinion of
Sopinka, J.).
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sense that they would have general acceptance among reasonable people." " 9
And thus, unlike their dissenting colleagues and their American
counterparts, the majority of the Canadian Court did not limit themselves
to a discussion of the appropriate balance to be struck between the specific
interests of identifiable parties and the abstract interests of a faceless state.
They saw the issue for what it was: a question that goes to the very nature
of the society in which we live.
Overall, then, it appears that a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide
* . . is the norm among western democracies, and such a prohibition
has never been adjudged to be unconstitutional or contrary to
fundamental human rights. Recent attempts to alter the status quo in
our neighbour to the south have been defeated by the electorate,
suggesting that despite a recognition that a blanket prohibition causes
suffering in certain cases, the societal concern with preserving life and
protecting the vulnerable rendered the blanket prohibition preferable
to a law which might not adequately prevent abuse. 120
The contrast is striking. Chief Judge Rothstein's opinion striking
down Washington state's law prohibiting assisted suicide characterizes the
matter as one of "first impression,"'' thus paving the way for a de novo
judicial balancing of the relevant rights and interests. The majority of the
Canadian Court took precisely the opposite approach when it undertook to
canvass the laws of several Western European countries, the British
Commonwealth, the European Commission on Human Rights, and state
and federal law in the United States.
22
The backdrop against which the question is decided is important. In
1908 Oliver Wendell Holmes observed: "All rights tend to declare
themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by
the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached."
23
As applied here, Holmes's observation cautions against reading
principles of liberty and autonomy in a vacuum, bereft of the teachings of
history, the lessons of the common law, or the experiences of others. His
oft-quoted axioms "A page of history is worth a volume of logic" and "The
life of the law has not been logic but experience" caution against the
tendency of judges to view newly "constitutionalized" questions as
"9id. at 406.
"2Id. at 404.
121Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. at 1455.
122See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R.4th at 401-04.
123Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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questions of first impression. The legality of assisted suicide and euthanasia
are questions that have been debated for centuries.
By what right'24 then does an Article III judge declare the philosophy
of Ronald Dworkin to be the "supreme law of the land"?2 Judge
Rothstein's reliance on the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'26 provides the answer.
The joint opinion in Casey adopts the "fundamental rights"
jurisprudence argued by the second Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman. 27 For
Harlan,
[tihe best that can be said [about the due process liberty principle] is
that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.... The balance of which I speak is the
balance struck by this country, having regard for what history teaches
are the traditions from which it broke."'
' 28
Assuming for purposes of the present analysis that both Justice Harlan
and the majority of the current Court are correct and that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does empower the Court to strike the
balance between "respect for the liberty of the individual . . . and the
demands of organized society," the key to determining whether or not a
right to euthanasia or assisted suicide is fundamental depends, in large part,
upon ascertaining the Court's view of "the balance struck by this country,
having regard for what history teaches are the traditions from which it
broke."
This, of course, is the problem. The legitimacy of any act of judicial
review turns upon its consistency with the Constitution. Just as "[t]he
principles of fundamental justice cannot be created for the occasion to
reflect the court's dislike or distaste of a particular statute," 29 neither can
the furtherance of an individual's interests be considered controlling. To
characterize an individual's desire to die as "involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy" is only the beginning of the inquiry, not
124The phrase is borrowed from Louis Lusky. Louis LusKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A
COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975).
12 5U.S. CONST. art. VI (1787).
126112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
127poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
128367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R.4th at 404 (opinion of
Sopinka, J.).
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its end.130 The decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court and the House of
Lords Select Committee accept as true that the decision to undergo
euthanasia or suicide "may originate within the zone of conscience and
belief;" for it is at least as personal and (to borrow a phrase from Casey) as
"fundamentally affecti[ve of] a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Nevertheless, the decision to elevate it to the rank of
fundamental right-and thus to create an exception to a law of general
applicability-is "more than a philosophic exercise." 131 Like abortion,
assisted suicide and euthanasia are
act[s] fraught with consequences for others: for the [person] who must
live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform
and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which
must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures
some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human
life .... 132
But unlike the specific burden pregnancy places only on women, the
discomfort, pain, decline, and death that attend disease, trauma, some
disabilities, and aging are not in any sense "unique to the human condition
and so unique to the law"; they are an integral part of that human
condition. And unless words have no meaning at all, killing by force,
neglect, or poison cannot validly be described as a means of enhancing the
human condition of the person to be killed. The human condition-at least
as we know it-ends with death.
This, of course, is why advocates for assisted suicide do not argue that
it is unconstitutional to deprive them of "the option of committing suicide
as such," but rather that it is unconstitutional to deprive a person "of the
right to choose suicide" 133 and the means of carrying that choice to
fruition.134 This is why rationales of the House of Lords Select Committee
and the Canadian Supreme Court must be read as nothing less than explicit
rejections of the Dworkin and Engelhardt formulations of the maxim
"Consent cures."
The choice is indeed a stark one. Canada's Chief Justice, Antonio
Lamer, admitted as much when he wrote:
13°Accord, Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 ("these considerations begin our analysis of the
woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it..
13l1d"
1321d.
133Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R.4th at 365 (Lamer,
CJ.C., dissenting)(emphasis in the original).
134107 D.L.R.4th at 417-19 (McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dubt, JJ., dissenting).
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The truth is that we simply do not and cannot know the range of
implications that allowing some form of assisted suicide will have for
persons with physical disabilities .... Respecting the consent of those
[who wish to commit suicide] may necessarily imply running the risk
that the consent will have been obtained improperly. 13 5
Does the concept of ordered liberty enshrined in the United States
Constitution require us to run such a risk when experience has shown that
"man is certain to behave as a wolf to his own kind"? 3 6 It doesn't. In fact, it
cannot without putting at risk the very order upon which our rights to life,
liberty, property, and equal protection depend.3 '
115107 D.L.R.4th at 376 (Lamer, CJ.C., dissenting).
136ignatieff, supra note 45, at 53.
137The Court's death penalty jurisprudence provides a useful comparison. See Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting and ScaliaJ., concurring).
Nota Bene

